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THE IMPERFECT BUT NECESSARY LAWSUIT: WHY
SUING STATE JUDGES IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE
THAT STATUTES CREATING A PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
INTRODUCTION
State legislatures can indirectly, but effectively, restrict consti-
tutional rights by enacting statutes that create a private cause of
action.' This is possible when the cause of action creates potential
damages that are so severe as to de facto compel people and enti-
ties from engaging in certain conduct. For example, if a statute
allows private citizens to sue a person when that person engages
in X, then individuals and entities may cease to engage in X if the
possible liability arising from engaging in X is too significant.
When the United States Constitution protects the conduct that
the statute de facto, though indirectly, compels people to forgo, a
serious issue arises.2
Statutes that create a private cause of action will only realisti-
cally be challenged if a pre-enforcement action is brought; 3 oth-
erwise, individuals and entities may choose not to engage in con-
duct that could potentially lead to liability under the cause of
action created by the state statute.4 If no pre-enforcement action
1. A "private cause of action" refers to a cause of action that provides the basis of a
lawsuit to private individuals, rather than public officials (like a prosecutor). For example,
while a typical criminal statute provides a cause of action to a state prosecutor when a
crime is committed, a private cause of action provides a civil cause of action only to private
citizens.
2. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and Constitutional Account-
ability, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 753, 756 (2006) ("To permit defiant state legislatures to circum-
vent the judicial process through shrewd legislative drafting is to contemplate an entirely
different form of government: one that posits that state government is equal or superior in
authority to the federal government, and one in which the legislative branch is virtually
unchecked by the judicial branch.").
3. A pre-enforcement challenge to a statute involves a lawsuit that challenges the
validity of the statute before it is enforced against the pre-enforcement plaintiff. See infra
Part II.A.
4. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 762 ("From a financial perspective, many organi-
zations [and individuals] are either unwilling or unable to risk losing a constitutional chal-
lenge and incurring massive liability, however remote the risk.").
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is brought and no one engages in the conduct that can lead to lia-
bility under the private cause of action (because no one wants to
risk liability), then no lawsuit can ever be brought under the
cause of action. Consequently, the statute's constitutionality will
never be challenged, and an unconstitutional statute can remain
in effect, de facto restricting individuals and entities from engag-
ing in certain conduct. Thus, pre-enforcement challenges are es-
sential to ensuring that statutes that create a private cause of ac-
tion are constitutional.
The key problem with challenging statutes that create a pri-
vate cause of action is that the state has no enforcement role-the
statute is "privately enforced" by private citizens bringing law-
suits under the cause of action the statute creates. As this com-
ment discusses, the only possible pre-enforcement lawsuit that
can challenge a statute that creates a private cause of action is a
lawsuit seeking an injunction against state judges.5 Contrary to
what previous scholars and judges have opined,6 suing public offi-
cials-like the state legislature, governor, and/or attorney gen-
eral-of the state that enacts a statute that creates a private
cause of action does not satisfy the all-important doctrine of
standing.7 Instead, the pre-enforcement action should be brought
against state judges who could potentially hear lawsuits brought
under the private cause of action created by the state statute. By
enjoining state judges from applying the purportedly unconstitu-
tional statute, at least until the statute's constitutionality can be
determined, constitutional rights will be protected by ensuring
that no constitutional rights are illegally restricted by the stat-
ute.
Part I of this comment provides examples of state statutes that
seemingly restrict, albeit indirectly, constitutional conduct by
creating a private cause of action, and explains why this issue is
5. See infra Parts III.B-IV.
6. See, e.g., Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2005) (Bris-
coe, J., dissenting) (opining that there is standing in a pre-enforcement action for declara-
tory relief against public officials); Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 434 (5th Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (Benavides, J., dissenting); Borgmann, supra note 2, at 774 (arguing that suing
public officials for a declaratory judgment satisfies standing); Maya Manian, Privatizing
Bans on Abortion: Eviscerating Constitutional Rights Through Tort Remedies, 80 TEMP. L.
REV. 123, 128 (2007) (arguing that a court should find standing when a pre-enforcement
action is brought against the state legislators that enacted the statute).
7. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (stating that the doctrine of
standing is the doctrine that ensures that Article III of the United States Constitution is
followed).
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important to discuss. Part II discusses pre-enforcement actions,
their importance, and the standing doctrine requirements that
must be met to bring a pre-enforcement action. Part III analyzes
how the standing doctrine applies to pre-enforcement actions that
challenge statutes that create a private cause of action. It ex-
plains how the "typical" pre-enforcement challenge-a lawsuit
against the state legislative or executive branch for injunctive or
declaratory relief-is not justiciable and does not satisfy the
standing doctrine, and thus, such a pre-enforcement action can-
not be brought. Part IV proposes a solution, arguing that a pre-
enforcement plaintiff challenging a state statute that creates a
private cause of action should seek an injunction against state
judges. Ironically, by suing state judges, the judiciary can ensure
that constitutional rights are protected.
I. STATE STATUTES CREATING A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION:
EXAMPLES AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THEIR SCOPE
There is obvious importance in ensuring that constitutional
rights are not infringed. Challenging a statute in court is a key
method to protect and safeguard constitutional rights. Often, the
greatest challenge for plaintiffs is proving, on the merits, that a
law infringes their constitutional rights. However, when the stat-
ute creates a private cause of action, the greater challenge may be
being able to even bring a lawsuit in the first place."
A fundamental principle of United States federalism is that
states cannot enact laws that facially restrict rights that the
United States Supreme Court has held to be protected by the
United States Constitution. Yet states can, and have, enacted
laws that, while not facially restricting constitutional rights, have
the de facto effect of restricting these rights.9 When this happens,
plaintiffs seeking to have a court rule that the law is unconstitu-
tional may be unable to bring a lawsuit to challenge the statute 0
because the statute is a privately enforced statute that creates a
private cause of action." Put simply, these statutes create a pri-
8. See, e.g., Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 429.
9. See, e.g., id. (finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the statute's
constitutionality, even though the panel previously held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional on the merits in Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 361 (5th Cir. 1999)).
10. See Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 429.
11. Unless otherwise specified, when this comment references a statute or cause of
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vate cause of action that imposes potential liability that is signifi-
cant enough to dissuade parties from engaging in constitutionally
protected conduct because they do not want to risk liability under
the private cause of action. As Part III.B discusses, the doctrine of
standing prevents the typical pre-enforcement challenge to these
laws. Specific examples of these laws are helpful to understand
their restriction on rights protected by the Constitution. Thus far,
these laws mostly, if not exclusively, come in the abortion con-
text. 12
A. Examples of State Statutes Creating a Private Cause of Action
In 1997, the Louisiana legislature passed a law known as Act
825.13 Act 825, in relevant part, states:
Section 2800.12. Liability for termination of a pregnancy
A. Any person who performs an abortion is liable to the mother of
the unborn child for any damage occasioned or precipitated by the
abortion, which action survives for a period of three years from the
date of discovery of the damage with a peremptive period of ten
years from the date of the abortion.14
Act 825 defines "damage" as including all damages that are "re-
coverable in an intentional tort, negligence, survival, or wrongful
death action."15 If the mother signed a consent form prior to the
abortion, the mother's damages are limited, but not negated.16 As
well, under Act 825, Louisiana's medical malpractice laws and
limitations of liability do not apply.17 In other words, Act 825
"provides to women who undergo an abortion a private tort reme-
dy against the doctors who perform the abortion. It exposes those
action, it is this type of statute and cause of action that is being referenced.
12. See, e.g., H.B. No. 1720, Reg. Sess. (La. 1997) (codified as LA. STAT. ANN. §
9:2800.12 (1997)); Holland Phillips, Louisiana Law Disallowing Med Mal Suits in Abortion
Cases Upheld at Appeals Court, LA. REC. (Sept. 16, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://louisiana rec-
ord.comlstories/510583791-louisiana-law-disallowing-med-mal-suits-in-abortion-cases-
upheld-at-ap peals-court. This comment is not intended to advocate any particular stance
on abortion, and should not be construed as taking any stance. While this comment does
discuss laws that potentially restrict abortions, it is solely in the context of the doctrines of
justiciability and standing and their effect on challenging laws that may restrict rights
that the Supreme Court has held to be constitutionally protected.
13. H.B. No. 1720; Phillips, supra note 12.
14. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12(A) (2009).
15. Id. § 9:2800.12(B)(2).
16. Id. § 9:2800.12(C)(1).
17. Id. § 9:2800.12(C)(2).
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doctors to unlimited tort liability for any damage," including emo-
tional suffering, that the mother and unborn child suffer as a re-
sult of the abortion procedure.18
In 2001, the Oklahoma legislature enacted a law similar to
Louisiana's Act 825, though more limited in nature. 19 The Okla-
homa statute provides that: "Any person who performs an abor-
tion on a minor without parental consent or knowledge shall be
liable for the cost of any subsequent medical treatment such mi-
nor might require because of the abortion." 20
Recently, two state legislatures have proposed bills that re-
semble Louisiana's Act 825 just discussed. In Iowa, the legisla-
ture is considering a bill that would allow a woman who had an
abortion to sue the physician who performed the abortion for all
damages resulting from the woman's emotional distress as a re-
sult of the abortion.21 The woman could bring the lawsuit at any
time, and her signing of a consent form prior to the abortion
would not negate damages, though it would limit them.22 Similar-
ly, in Florida, a bill was introduced that would give a woman who
had an abortion a cause of action against the physician who pro-
vided the abortion if the woman suffered physical injury, or suf-
fered emotional distress due to the physician failing to obtain in-
formed consent. 23
While the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade opined that the right
to an abortion is a constitutionally protected right, 24 the statutes
just discussed arguably threaten this right, as doctors and clinics
that perform abortions in states with these statutes face poten-
tially enormous liability if they perform abortions. 25 Moreover,
doctors and clinics would be under a constant threat of litigation.
For example, a woman who has an abortion in 2017 may change
her stance on abortion twenty years later and suffer emotional
distress knowing that she had an abortion in 2017. Most of the
statutes just described would allow her to sue the doctor who pro-
18. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
19. H.B. 1727, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2001).
20. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-740 (2016).
21. S.F. 26, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2017).
22. Id.
23. H.B. 19, 2017 Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017) (died in Judiciary Committee on
May 5, 2017).
24. 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
25. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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vided the abortion. Because of this risk, doctors and clinics may
reasonably calculate that the potential liability is too much to
continue providing abortions. 26 As such, they may simply stop
providing abortions.
But before ceasing to provide abortions or being sued them-
selves under the private cause of action, doctors and pro-choice
medical clinics have filed pre-enforcement lawsuits challenging
the aforementioned statutes already enacted. In Louisiana, abor-
tion providers filed a pre-enforcement action against the state's
governor and attorney general, challenging the constitutionality
of Act 825.27 However, the plaintiffs ultimately lacked standing
and were thus unable to challenge the lawsuit because the court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. 28 Thus, Louisiana abortion
providers were left with deciding whether to continue providing
abortions, knowing that Act 825 created the possibility of "unlim-
ited tort liability," 2 9 or ceasing to provide abortions altogether to
escape potential liability.
Similarly, an Oklahoma abortion provider filed a pre-
enforcement action against public health officials, challenging the
constitutionality of Oklahoma's statute on the grounds that the
law compelled it to deny abortions to young women who sought
an abortion but had not informed their parents of their decision. 30
The court ultimately held that the pre-enforcement plaintiff
lacked standing for a pre-enforcement challenge, and thus could
not bring the lawsuit. 31 Abortion providers in Oklahoma were
consequently left with choosing whether to risk liability or not
provide abortions to minors whose parents did not know of or
consent to the abortion. Moreover, in both Louisiana and Okla-
homa, if abortion providers choose to cease providing abortions,
women in these states may be unable to obtain abortions unless
they travel out of state.
26. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 762.
27. Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 979 (E.D. La. 1998).
28. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 428-29 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
29. Id. at 409.
30. Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 2005).
31. Id. at 1160; see also Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603, 606 (7th Cir. 2001) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff-medical clinic lacked standing in a pre-enforcement action challeng-
ing the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute and an Illinois statute that created a civil
cause of action for damages resulting from an abortion).
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It is true that abortion providers can challenge the constitu-
tionality of the aforementioned statutes in court once a woman
who had an abortion sues them under the statute, raising the
statute's unconstitutionality as a defense to their liability.32 How-
ever, at that point, doctors and clinics must win their constitu-
tionality argument or be liable for enormous damages. Without a
way to challenge the statute prior to becoming subject to the
cause of action, doctors and clinics, while firmly believing the
statute to be unconstitutional, may not be willing to risk millions
of dollars in order to provide an abortion, be sued, and challenge
the statute in the ensuing lawsuit.33 Instead, they may simply
cease to provide abortions.
B. Unlimited Possibilities of State Statutes Creating a Private
Cause of Action
While these laws creating a private cause of action are seem-
ingly limited to the abortion context today, tomorrow's laws may
be used to threaten other rights that the Constitution has been
held to protect. For example, a state could enact a law that cre-
ates a private cause of action that allows a person who buys a
firearm to sue the seller if the buyer later suffers emotional dis-
tress or physical injury as a result of that firearm. Or, the law
could provide a cause of action to a person who suffers emotional
distress from witnessing the purchase of a firearm at a gun show
or a firearm store, regardless of the legality of the sale. Such laws
would have the real possibility of limiting those who would be
willing to sell firearms, thus restricting an individual's right to
"keep and bear [a]rms."34 Another possibility is a state law that
provides a cause of action to a person who suffers emotionally
from seeing an interracial married couple. If a law allowed a per-
son to sue the officiant of the interracial wedding for emotional
distress, that could result in officiants no longer being willing to
marry interracial couples due to the risk of being liable for a sig-
nificant amount of damages. As such, the law may de facto result
in interracial couples not being able to legally marry.
32. A statute is unconstitutional if it creates an "undue burden" for a woman to gain
access to an abortion. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
33. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 765.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2018] 501
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There are countless possible laws that could create private
causes of action that have the effect of limiting constitutional
rights. 35 Thus, this issue should concern conservatives, liberals,
and everyone in between.
II. THE IMPORTANCE AND AVAILABILITY OF PRE-ENFORCEMENT
CHALLENGES
A. The Importance of Pre-Enforcement Challenges
As Part I explained, statutes creating a private cause of action
may compel certain parties to not engage in arguably constitu-
tionally protected conduct. While these statutes are modern, the
dilemma that these statutes create is not new.
Leading up to the century-old and well-known case Ex Parte
Young, 36 Minnesota passed a statute that regulated railroad
rates. 37 In order to dissuade railroad companies from violating
the statute to challenge its constitutionality in court, the Minne-
sota legislature imposed severe civil and criminal penalties for vi-
olating the rates. 38 Prior to violating the statute, the railroad
companies filed suit, claiming that the statute was unconstitu-
tional and that it forced them to comply with a purportedly un-
constitutional law so as not to risk the severe penalties. 39 The Su-
preme Court agreed that the law had this effect, stating that no
railroad employee could be "expected to disobey . . . [the statute]
at the risk of such fines and penalties being imposed upon them,
in case the court should decide that the law was valid." 4 0 In other
words, the Court recognized that the statute's penalties were so
severe that no railroad employee would disobey the statute due to
the risk-however minimal-that a court could find the statute to
be constitutional and, thus, the penalties to be valid. Indeed, the
Court opined that when a statute imposes penalties that are so
severe as to dissuade parties from disobeying the statute and
35. While the potential hypotheticals are endless, this comment focuses its analysis on
the abortion context as that is the context that real laws and cases have concerned.
36. 209 U.S. 123, 127 (1908).
37. John Harrison, Ex Parte Young, 60 STAN. L. REV. 989, 991 (2008).
38. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 145; Harrison, supra note 37, at 991-92.
39. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 144-45.
40. Id. at 146.
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challenging its constitutionality in court, it has the same effect as
if the statute facially restricted that conduct. 41
Thus, the need arose, which the Supreme Court recognized, 42
for pre-enforcement challenges to a statute. A pre-enforcement
challenge to a statute involves a lawsuit that challenges the va-
lidity of the statute before the statute is enforced against the
plaintiff. Essentially, the plaintiff requests the court for an in-
junction enjoining enforcement of the statute or a declaration
that the statute is unconstitutional. 4 3 A pre-enforcement action
remedies the dilemma of having to either cease engaging in con-
stitutionally protected conduct or continue engaging in the liabil-
ity-creating conduct in order to challenge it at the risk of being
subject to extreme penalties." The pre-enforcement plaintiff, be-
fore violating the statute or engaging in conduct that gives rise to
potential liability, can challenge the statute without being subject
to the statute's penalties, as the pre-enforcement action occurs
before the pre-enforcement plaintiff actually engages in the liabil-
ity-creating conduct. If the court finds the statute constitutional,
then the statute is not restricting constitutional conduct, and the
pre-enforcement plaintiff knows to comply with the statute; con-
versely, if the court finds the statute unconstitutional, the pre-
enforcement plaintiff can choose not to comply with the statute
without risk of liability under the cause of action created by the
statute.
In the context of the abortion statutes creating a private cause
of action discussed in Part I, abortion providers employed pre-
enforcement lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the
statute before they stopped providing abortions or were sued un-
der the statutes.45
41. See id. at 147.
42. See id. at 149.
43. See, e.g., infra Part ll.C.
44. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S._,_ , 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2342
(2014) (stating that the Supreme Court has "permitted pre-enforcement review under cir-
cumstances that render the threatened enforcement [of the statute] sufficiently immi-
nent"); Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 435 (5th Cir. 2001) (Benavides, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the purpose of pre-enforcement relief, like a declaratory judgment, is to pre-
vent the Hobson's choice of deciding whether to cease engaging in the conduct or risk se-
vere penalties by challenging the statute); cf. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)
(opining that a plaintiff "should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecu-
tion as the sole means of seeking relief').
45. See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 2005) (involving
plaintiffs seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on the grounds that Oklahoma's stat-
2018] 503
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
B. Requirements to Bring a Pre-enforcement Challenge:
Standing46
There are requirements that a plaintiff must satisfy to bring a
pre-enforcement action.47 One such requirement, and the focus of
this comment, is standing.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies."48 However,
the Constitution does not define what constitutes a "case" or "con-
troversy."49 Despite the lack of a definition, the Supreme Court
has concluded that the "basic inquiry" of the cases and controver-
sies requirement is "whether the 'conflicting contentions of the
parties . . . present a real, substantial controversy between par-
ties having adverse legal interests."'" 0 To help determine if the
parties have the requisite controversy and adverse legal interests,
and thus, whether a case is justiciable under Article III's cases
and controversies requirement, the Supreme Court developed the
doctrine of standing.51 Therefore, while the doctrine of standing is
based on Article III of the Constitution, it is a court-made doc-
trine arising from the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article
III. Put simply, standing doctrine effectuates the cases and con-
troversies requirement. 52 In short, when bringing a lawsuit, be-
fore the merits of a case are even considered, standing must be
satisfied. 53
ute, tit. 63, § 1-740, was unconstitutional); Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 979 (E.D.
La. 1998) (involving plaintiffs requesting a preliminary injunction to enjoin Louisiana's
Act 825).
46. For the discussion that follows, it is important to remember that the standing
analysis is not tantamount to an analysis on the merits of a claim. The standing analysis
is applied before the merits are considered. If a party has standing, that does not neces-
sarily mean that that party will win on the merits. Likewise, if a party does not have
standing, that does not mean that it has a meritless claim. A party can lack standing
while having a claim that would otherwise be successful.
47. For example, for a case to be justiciable, the plaintiff must have standing, the case
cannot be moot, the case must be ripe, and the case cannot involve a political question.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 42 (7th ed. 2016).
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).
49. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559.
50. Babbitt v. UFW Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979).
51. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298; see also Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C.L. REV. 1741, 1767 (1999).
52. See Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or Three Compet-
ing Philosophies of Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 218 (2014).
53. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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To have standing, the plaintiff must show that three require-
ments are satisfied. First, the plaintiff must have suffered "an in-
jury in fact"-i.e., a violation of a legally protected interest-that
is "(a) concrete and particularized" and "(b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical." 54 Second, there must be a causal
connection between the plaintiffs injury and the defendant's con-
duct, meaning the plaintiffs injury is "fairly traceable" to the de-
fendant's conduct and not a result of "the independent action of
some third party not before the court."5 5 Third, "it must be likely,
as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be re-
dressed" by the court ruling for the plaintiff. 56 Put simply, for
there to be standing, the plaintiff must have (1) suffered an inju-
ry, (2) that was caused by the defendant, and (3) will be redressed
by the court ruling in the plaintiffs favor.
However, in the case of pre-enforcement relief, there may be no
injury that has yet occurred because the plaintiff is challenging
the statute before it is enforced against her 57-thus, while the in-
jury may not yet be "actual," it must still be "imminent" to satisfy
standing.58 The Supreme Court held that in order to have suf-
fered an injury in fact that satisfies the standing requirement in
a pre-enforcement action, the plaintiff: (1) must allege an "inten-
tion to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a con-
stitutional interest"; (2) must intend to engage in future conduct
that is "arguably . . . proscribed by [the] statute" the plaintiff
wishes to challenge; and (3) must allege that the threat of future
enforcement of the statute is "substantial," such as there being a
history of past enforcement of the statute at issue.59 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has held that for the threat of future en-
forcement to be "substantial," and thus satisfy the "imminent" re-
quirement, the injury must be "certainly impending,"60 or, at the
54. Id. (citations omitted).
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 561 (citations omitted).
57. Cf. Babbitt v. UFW Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (holding that the plain-
tiff can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement when there is simply a "credible threat of
prosecution," and he has not actually been arrested).
58. Cf. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (holding that the injury in fact must be "actual or im-
minent") (emphasis added).
59. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343-45
(2014) (citing Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298-99).
60. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
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very least, there must be a "substantial risk that the harm will
occur." 61
C. Remedies in a Pre-Enforcement Action
When a plaintiff files a pre-enforcement action, the requested
relief is an injunction, a declaratory judgment, or both. 62 An in-
junction would enjoin the enforcement of the statute. If a declara-
tory judgment was requested and granted, the court would "de-
clare" that the statute at issue is unconstitutional, though
without an injunction, the statute could still technically be en-
forced; however, the court's declaration could be used to later ob-
tain an injunction enjoining enforcement of the statute. 63 Thus,
when applied to the requirements of standing, the requested pre-
enforcement relief-an injunction or declaratory judgment-must
be likely to redress the plaintiffs injury.64
III. THE EFFECT A STATUTE THAT CREATES A PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION HAS ON THE AVAILABILITY OF PRE-ENFORCEMENT
CHALLENGES
The abortion statutes discussed in Part I are ultimately pri-
vately enforced, meaning that none of the typical enforcement
powers are given to state officials (such as a prosecutor)-the
statute is "enforced" by private citizens who file lawsuits under
the statute. 65 As this section discusses, the private-enforcing na-
ture of these statutes seemingly prevents pre-enforcement actions
to be brought under current standing doctrine-namely because
it is unclear who the defendant should be. While standing's inju-
61. Id. at 414 n.5 (internal quotations omitted). See infra Part III.A for a discussion
on this "imminent" injury standard.
62. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454-55 (1974) (plaintiffs initially re-
questing injunctive and declaratory relief); Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149,
1152 (10th Cir. 2005) (plaintiffs requesting injunctive and declaratory relief); Okpalobi v.
Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 979 (E.D. La. 1998) (plaintiffs requesting a preliminary injunc-
tion).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (2012); Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory
Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1110-11 (2014).
64. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
65. Professor Maya Manian refers to such a statute as "self-enforcing" and defines it
as a law that "imposes such a high risk of a severe penalty on constitutionally protected
conduct that it freezes that conduct as effectively as a criminal or regulatory ban." Mani-
an, supra note 6, at 126.
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ry-in-fact requirement focuses on the plaintiff66-and thus will
not change regardless of the defendant-the causation and re-
dressability requirements focus on the defendant, and thus, will
be affected by who the defendant is. 6 7 As such, this comment pro-
ceeds by first analyzing the injury-in-fact requirement and then
analyzing the causation and redressability requirements based on
the possible relief and the possible defendants.
A. Injury in Fact
To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of standing in a pre-
enforcement action, the plaintiff (1) must allege "an intention to
engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitu-
tional interest"; (2) must intend to engage in future conduct that
is "arguably . .. proscribed by [the] statute" the plaintiff wishes to
challenge; and (3) must allege that the threat of future enforce-
ment of the statute is "substantial"68 or "credible."6 9 To satisfy
this third requirement that the threat be "substantial" or "credi-
ble," the injury must be "certainly impending,"7 0 or at the very
least, there must be a "'substantial risk' that the harm will oc-
cur."
7 1
In the case of the abortion statutes creating a private cause of
action discussed in Part I, the pre-enforcement plaintiff-the
abortion provider-seeks to engage in conduct that is "arguably
affected with a constitutional interest." 7 2 The plaintiff abortion
providers seek to engage in the profession of their choice. 73 As
well, the plaintiff abortion provider may have third-party stand-
ing to bring a lawsuit on behalf of his or her potential patients,
who will not have in-state access to an abortion if all the abortion
66. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (focusing the injury-in-fact analysis on what injury the
plaintiff suffered).
67. See id. at 560-61 (stating that to have standing, the injury must have been caused
by the defendant and will be redressed by winning the lawsuit against the defendant).
68. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. -, -, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343-45
(2014) (citing Babbitt v. UFW Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298-99 (1979)).
69. Id. at 2342 (citing Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298).
70. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409-10 (2013) (citing Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
71. Id. at 415 n.5 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 141
(2010)).
72. Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at _, 134 S. Ct. at 2343 (quoting Babbit, 442 U.S.
at 298).
73. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 980 (E.D. La. 1998).
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providers cease to provide abortions due to the statute.74 The
third-party standing concerns the women's constitutional right to
not experience an undue burden in obtaining an abortion. 5 As
such, the plaintiff abortion providers' conduct is "arguably affect-
ed with a constitutional interest." 76
Next, while the statutes do not facially prohibit providing abor-
tions, the future conduct of providing abortions is at least "argua-
bly . .. proscribed by [the] statute."77 Facing the potential for "un-
limited tort liability" if one provides an abortion,78 it is quite
reasonable to feel compelled to cease engaging in the conduct that
could open oneself up to such liability.
The final requirement is less clear, as Okpalobi v. Foster79 and
Nova Health System v. Gandy,80 the two chief cases addressing
the standing question of pre-enforcement review of a privately en-
forced statute that creates a private cause of action, were decided
before Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.81 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit in Okpalobi and the Tenth Circuit in Nova Health Sys-
tems did not apply Clapper. As such, it is necessary to analyze
and apply Clapper's holding to the types of statutes this comment
addresses.
The statute at issue in Clapper was a 2008 amendment to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1881a. 8 2 Section 1881a expanded the government's authority to
engage in electronic surveillance. 83 The plaintiffs in Clapper were
attorneys and organizations who worked with foreign individuals
outside the United States." The plaintiffs claimed that § 1881a
forced them to stop communicating with their foreign clients via
telephone and e-mail because of the risk of surveillance.85 Moreo-
ver, the plaintiffs claimed that they had to undertake "costly and
74. See, e.g., id.
75. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
76. Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at -, 134 S. Ct. at 2343 (quoting Babbitt, 442
U.S. at 298) (alterations in original).
77. Id. at 2344 (quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298).
78. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
79. Id.
80. 416 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2005).
81. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
82. Id. at 401.
83. Id. at 402, 404.
84. Id. at 406.
85. Id. at 406-07.
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burdensome measures," like traveling abroad to have face-to-face
conversations with their clients, in order to avoid surveillance
and protect the confidentiality of their communications. 86
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not suffer an in-
jury in fact that would create standing.87 In so concluding, the
Supreme Court held that in order to suffer an "imminent" injury,
the harm has to be "certainly impending."88 The Court stated that
a plaintiff "cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting
harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future
harm that is not certainly impending."89 Thus, without "certainly
impending" harm, it appears that a plaintiff cannot have stand-
ing for pre-enforcement review.
In footnote 5 of the Clapper opinion ("Footnote 5"), however,
the majority stated there could be standing "based on a 'substan-
tial risk' that the harm will occur."90 Instead of holding that this
"substantial risk" standard does not apply, the Supreme Court
simply stated that the plaintiffs failed even this more lenient
standard.91 Thus, the Court left open the question of what satis-
flies "imminent" injury.92 It is possible that, due to the inclusion of
Footnote 5 in the majority opinion, the stricter "certainly impend-
ing" standard only applies to intelligence and foreign affairs cas-
es.9 3 Indeed, one year after Clapper, the Court stated in Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus that "[a]n allegation of future injury
may suffice if the threatened injury is 'certainly impending,' or
there is a 'substantial risk' that the harm will occur." 9 4
Applying Clapper's "imminent" injury analysis to statutes that
create a private cause of action, it is likely that a pre-enforcement
plaintiff can satisfy this requirement. Regarding the abortion
86. Id.
87. Id. at 422.
88. Id. at 409 (emphasis in original omitted).
89. Id. at 416.
90. Id. at 414 n.5.
91. Id. 414-15 n.5.
92. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 52, at 215; see also Andrew C. Sand, Note, Standing
Uncertainty: An Expected-Value Standard for Fear-Based Injury in Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA, 113 MICH. L. REV. 711, 732 (2015) (arguing that Footnote 5's "substan-
tial risk" standard should be used over the "certainly impending" standard).
93. See Mank, supra note 52, at 264 (stating that at least the Second and Federal Cir-
cuits have suggested that the "substantial risk" standard articulated in Footnote 5 is still
applicable).
94. 573 U.S. _, _, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (citing Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409, 414
n.5) (emphasis added).
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statutes described in Part I, these statutes creating a private
cause of action are distinguishable from Clapper. First, in Clap-
per, the threat of surveillance applied to every individual who
communicated over phone, computer, or any other electronic de-
vice 95-thus, the odds that the specific plaintiffs in Clapper would
be subject to surveillance was statistically miniscule. However, in
the state abortion statutes creating the private cause of action,
only abortion providers were at risk of injury-an exponentially
smaller class of parties than in Clapper. Additionally, in Clapper,
one reason the Court found that there was no imminent injury
was because the plaintiffs could not show that the government
would specifically use § 1881a, as opposed to some other authori-
ty, to engage in electronic surveillance. 96 In the state abortion
statutes, that statute alone creates the cause of action-thus, the
plaintiff abortion provider could unequivocally demonstrate the
source of the injury.
Moreover, the fact that these state statutes were enacted sug-
gests an "imminent" injury. The state legislatures enacted these
statutes for one or two reasons: (1) they genuinely sought to pro-
vide women a cause of action to provide women greater protection
and rights in the time following their abortion, and/or (2) they
knew the statute would dissuade abortion providers from offering
abortions. If the first reason was the basis for the statute, the en-
actment of the statute shows that it was expected that women
would use the newly created cause of action. If the second reason
was the purpose of the statute, the statute's enactment would on-
ly be effective if the threat of a lawsuit under the newly created
cause of action was real and imminent. Either way, the statute's
enactment suggests an imminent injury sufficient to meet the
"certainly impending" requirement and surely sufficient to meet
Footnote 5's "substantial risk" requirement.97
Finally, the abortion providers' injury cannot actually become
any more "imminent" following the statute's enactment until an
actual lawsuit is brought against it, at which point, the harm
converts from "imminent" to "actual." While the more abortions a
95. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 402, 406.
96. Id. at 411, 414.
97. Cf. Joshua Newborn, Note, An Analysis of Credible Threat Standing and Ex Parte
Young for Second Amendment Litigation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 927, 933-34 (2009) (dis-
cussing how more recently enacted statutes are construed to more likely create a credible
threat of injury than older statutes).
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doctor provides increases the statistical probability that a patient
will bring a lawsuit later, the reality is that there arose an immi-
nent injury-an imminent threat of a lawsuit-when the statute
was enacted (assuming the abortion provider had provided abor-
tions in the past). As well, abortion providers, at the time of the
pre-enforcement action, are already de facto compelled from en-
gaging in purportedly constitutionally protected conduct. Thus,
standing's injury-in-fact requirement is satisfied.
B. Causation and Redressability
In addition to there being an imminent injury, the doctrine of
standing also requires that there be a causal connection between
the plaintiffs injury and the defendant's conduct-the causation
requirement-and that obtaining the requested relief from the
defendant will redress the plaintiffs injury-the redressability
requirement. To satisfy causation, the plaintiffs injury must be
"fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct and not a result of
"the independent action of some third party not before the
court." 98 To satisfy the redressability requirement, "it must be
'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be
'redressed"' by the court ruling for the plaintiff.99
Both causation and redressability concentrate on the defend-
ant-the analysis ultimately is focused on whether the defendant
caused the injury, and whether the requested relief against the
defendant will redress the injury. Thus, who the named defend-
ant is will determine whether these requirements are satisfied.
The seemingly obvious and typical defendants in a pre-
enforcement action are the state legislature or state executive (of-
ten, the attorney general).100 This is because the legislature en-
acts the statute, and the attorney general typically enforces the
statute. Moreover, in regard to privately enforced statutes, the
pre-enforcement action comes before any plaintiff has sued under
the private cause of action. So the defendant cannot be a private
citizen that could possibly sue under the statute, as she is un-
known-there is simply no way of knowing which of the millions
of people in the state will actually bring a lawsuit under the pri-
vate cause of action.
98. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 561.
100. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 429 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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In addition to the named defendant, the plaintiffs requested
relief will also affect whether the redressability requirement is
met because the requested relief must redress the injury. Relief
by way of monetary damages does not solve the issue created by a
private cause of action. 101 Thus, as discussed in Part II.C above,
the two types of relief in pre-enforcement actions are declaratory
judgments and injunctions. After discussing why a declaratory
judgment in this context is an improper advisory opinion and
does not satisfy standing, this comment will explain why an in-
junction against the "typical" defendants also does not satisfy
standing.
1. Declaratory Judgment Against State Public Officials Is an
Advisory Opinion and Fails the Redressability Requirement
There have been heated debates as to whether a declaratory
judgment would remedy the pre-enforcement plaintiffs injury re-
garding the creation of a private cause of action.102 But as will be
discussed, a declaratory judgment against state public officials is
a nonjusticiable advisory opinion. As well, it fails to redress the
plaintiffs injury, so there is no standing if a declaratory judgment
is sought.
The Declaratory Judgment Act states that a federal court can
"declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested par-
ty seeking such declaration." 1 0 3 A declaratory judgment can be
101. This is because damages are awarded after an injury occurs-a pre-enforcement
plaintiff cannot obtain damages before the ultimate injury occurs. Thus, to obtain damag-
es in the abortion context, for example, the abortion provider would have to be sued under
the private cause of action, and if damages were awarded against him, then the abortion
provider would sue the state government for the damages it is forced to pay under the pri-
vate cause of action. However, the abortion provider would only get damages from the gov-
ernment if the statute creating the private cause of action is unconstitutional; otherwise,
the abortion provider has no claim against the state government officials. Thus, the abor-
tion provider faces the same problem discussed throughout this comment-he is forced to
decide whether to not provide abortions, or to provide abortions and hope that he convinc-
es the court that the statute is unconstitutional.
102. Compare Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir. 2005) (hold-
ing that a declaratory judgment against the defendants would not redress the plaintiffs
injury), and Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 431 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (stating that a de-
claratory judgment would not redress the injury), with Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at
1163-64 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (arguing that a declaration that the statute was unconsti-
tutional would redress the injury), and Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 436 (Benavides, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that a declaratory judgment would redress the injury), and Borgmann, supra
note 2, at 780 (arguing that a declaratory judgment would redress the injury in Okpalobi
and Nova Health Systems).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
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awarded even if an injunction cannot be awarded. 104 Indeed, a de-
claratory judgment was formed to be an alternative to an injunc-
tion105 and was intended to allow a party to obtain pre-
enforcement relief before he or she is subject to criminal prosecu-
tion (or liability).106
However, relief by way of a declaratory judgment must still
meet the requirements of standing. 107 In deciding whether to
award a declaratory judgment, the court must determine whether
there is a "substantial controversy, between parties having ad-
verse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to war-
rant the issuance of a declaratory judgment."108 As Article III only
allows federal courts to hear actual "cases" and "controversies,"
and the doctrine of standing determines what is a "case" or "con-
troversy,"1 09 the declaratory judgment against the specific de-
fendant must still satisfy standing by redressing the plaintiffs in-
jury.
Furthermore, a declaratory judgment cannot be awarded if it is
merely an "advisory opinion.""10 While there is no universal defi-
nition of an advisory opinion, an advisory opinion is essentially a
judicial opinion that has "no effect in the real world."1 ' Professor
104. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72 (1985).
105. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 467 (1974) (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82, 115 (1971)).
106. Id. at 467-68, 468 n.18; see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 490 F.2d 536, 543 (3d Cir.
1974) ("The objectives of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act are: . . . 'to avoid accrual of
avoidable damages to one not certain of his rights and to afford him an early adjudication
without waiting until his adversary should see fit to begin suit, after damage had ac-
crued."' (citations omitted)).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012) (limiting the jurisdiction of federal courts to award
a declaratory judgment to instances when there is "a case of actual controversy"); Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (stating that the doctrine of standing identifies
what is a justiciable "case" and "controversy"); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S.
227, 239-40 (1937) (holding that the Declaratory Judgment Act's language limiting de-
claratory judgments to "cases of actual controversy" limit its use to the "cases and contro-
versies" requirement articulated in the Constitution); see also Michael E. Rosman, Chal-
lenges to State Anti-Preference Laws and the Role of Federal Courts, 18 WIM. & MARY BELL
RTS. J. 709, 729 (2010).
108. Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 203 (1958) (per curiam) (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v.
Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 279, 273 (1941)).
109. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
110. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761, 763 (1987) (holding that a proper judicial
resolution of a "case or controversy" cannot be an advisory opinion); F.C.C. v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 735 (1978) ("[F]ederal courts have never been empowered to
issue advisory opinions.").
111. F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 Nw. U.L. REV. 55, 80-81 (2012)
("[A] decision on a claim based on an extremely-low-probability injury would arguably be
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Erwin Chemerinsky asserts that a case is a nonjusticiable adviso-
ry opinion if it does not involve "an actual dispute between ad-
verse litigants" or if there is a "substantial likelihood" that the
court's decision would not "bring about some change or have some
effect." 112
In reviewing whether a declaratory judgment is an advisory
opinion or redresses a plaintiffs injury, the Supreme Court stat-
ed:
Redress is sought through the court, but from the defendant ....
The real value of the judicial pronouncement-what makes it a
proper judicial resolution of a "case or controversy" rather than an
advisory opinion-is in the settling of some dispute which affects the
behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff.113
For this reason, when a plaintiff challenges a privately enforced
statute that creates a private cause of action by suing a public of-
ficial, the declaratory judgment is a nonjusticiable advisory opin-
ion and does not redress the plaintiffs injury.
A court's declaration-against defendant public officials 1 14 -
that a statute that creates a private cause of action is unconstitu-
tional, without more, is a mere advisory opinion. It has no "effect
in the real world,"115 and does not affect "the behavior of the de-
fendant towards the plaintiff," thus rendering it an advisory opin-
ion.116 A court's "declaration" that the statute creating the private
cause of action is unconstitutional would only affect the defend-
ant public officials' behavior if they sought to bring a private law-
suit on their own behalf under the private cause of action (e.g., in
the abortion context, a public official had an abortion and suf-
fered damages) or they were to enforce the statute. Because the
public officials who are sued in the pre-enforcement challenge are
neither bringing a private suit under the private cause of action,
an advisory opinion because resolving the claim would require the court to provide relief
from an injury that is almost certain not to occur and thus likely to have no real-world ef-
fect.").
112. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 47, at 49.
113. Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 761.
114. The only possible defendants in a declaratory judgment action are public officials
because it is unknown which private citizens, if any, will bring a private lawsuit under the
private cause of action. See supra Part III.B.
115. See Hessick, supra note 111, at 80-81.
116. Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 761 (emphasis in original omitted); see also CHEMERINSKY, su-
pra note 47, at 49-51.
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nor enforcing the statute,117 there is no real effect on the defend-
ant public officials' behavior; they would not need to change their
conduct in any way. Thus, a declaration of the statute's unconsti-
tutionality is a nonjusticiable advisory opinion.
But even if the declaratory judgment here is not an advisory
opinion, a declaratory judgment would still not redress the plain-
tiffs injury in a pre-enforcement action challenging the constitu-
tionality of a statute creating a private cause of action. Courts
and scholars have advanced several incorrect rationales for why a
declaratory judgment-i.e., the court simply declaring the statute
to be unconstitutional-redresses the plaintiffs injury. The first
rationale is that the declaration would comfort the pre-
enforcement plaintiff by allowing him to believe that he can en-
gage in the conduct because if he is later sued under the private
cause of action, the statute that created it will definitely be found
unconstitutional (and thus the private cause of action is inva-
lid). 118 The second rationale is that the declaration would deter
other potential litigants (i.e., women who had an abortion) from
bringing a lawsuit under the statute.119
The first rationale is simply incorrect, and the declaratory
judgment remains an advisory opinion that does not redress any
injury. State courts and lower federal courts are "separate and co-
equal." 12 0 As such, state courts are not bound by a federal court's
declaratory judgment if a subsequent lawsuit involves parties dif-
ferent from the declaratory judgment action (i.e., the pre-
enforcement action). 121 Thus, if an abortion provider obtains a de-
claratory judgment that the state law is unconstitutional and is
later sued by a woman who previously had an abortion, the state
117. The fact that the public officials do not enforce the statute can be illustrated in a
simple manner: if the court prohibited the public official from "enforcing" the statute (like
a prosecutor enforces a criminal statute), the statute still remains in effect, and private
citizens can still sue under the private cause of action.
118. Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 436 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Benavides, J., dis-
senting); see Borgmann, supra note 2, at 781-82.
119. See, e.g., Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir. 2005);
Borgmann, supra note 2, at 780.
120. John H. Martin, The Binding Effect of Federal Declaratory Judgments on State
Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 743, 753 (1973).
121. Id. ("Because the state courts enjoy concurrent, coequal jurisdiction with the fed-
eral courts over questions of the constitutionality of state statutes, the state courts should
not be broadly bound by federal declarations short of a federal court injunction against
state court action." (citation omitted)); Rosman, supra note 107, at 733-34; see David L.
Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 759, 771
(1979).
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court 2 2 hearing that lawsuit is not required to afford the declara-
tory judgment any weight. Thus, the declaratory judgment would
not provide the pre-enforcement plaintiff any real relief. As Mi-
chael Rosman candidly points out:
As a matter of common sense, if substantial liability has a signifi-
cant chilling effect on the behavior of some actors, the fact that those
actors have one additional non-binding authority to cite in a lawsuit
against them, or that one of many potential litigants could not sue
them, would not seem to provide much of a thaw. 123
As such, the declaratory judgment would not redress the inju-
ry. 124
The problem with the second rationale-that the declaration
would deter other potential litigants from bringing a lawsuit un-
der the statute-is that it is merely speculative, and thus fails the
requirement that it "be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,'
that the injury will be 'redressed"' by the court ruling for the
plaintiff.125 Moreover, a private citizen is not likely to be deterred
from bringing her own lawsuit under the private cause of action
because she is not limited by the declaratory judgment of the pre-
enforcement action of which she was not a party.126 This is be-
cause the pre-enforcement action's declaratory judgment has no
res judicata effect1 27 on parties not a part of the lawsuit. 128 It is
122. In most, if not all cases, a state court would hear the lawsuit brought under the
private cause of action. This is because it would be a state law claim (arising under the
state statute), so there would be no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Even if the abortion provider raised the statute's unconstitutionality as a defense, there
would still be no federal question in the plaintiffs complaint. Moreover, there would likely
be no diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the woman likely obtained an
abortion from a provider within the state in which she lived, so there likely would be no
diversity of citizenship. But even if a federal court were to hear the lawsuit under diversi-
ty jurisdiction, there is still no res judicata effect on a declaratory judgment when it is
sought to be used against a party who was not subject to the declaratory judgment action.
123. Rosman, supra note 107, at 734-35.
124. While it is true that 28 U.S.C. § 2202 allows a court to use a declaratory judgment
as the basis for an injunction, see Bray, supra note 63, at 1111, the plaintiff must still
have standing to go back to court and obtain an injunction. Thus, the pre-enforcement
plaintiff must have standing for an injunction against the same defendant against whom
the declaratory judgment was awarded. See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (2012) (limiting the "further
relief'-i.e., the injunction-to be awarded against the party whose rights were affected by
the initial declaratory judgment). As Parts III.B.2-3 discuss, an injunction against the de-
fendant public official-the party of the initial declaratory judgment action-does not re-
dress the plaintiffs injury, and thus there is no standing for the declaratory judgment to
be converted into an injunction.
125. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (citations omitted).
126. See Rosman, supra note 107, at 733.
127. Res judicata precludes the litigation of issues that were litigated in a previous ac-
516 [Vol. 52:495
IMPERFECT BUT NECESSARY LAWSUIT
the res judicata effect that impacts the defendant's behavior to-
wards the plaintiff.1 29 Because there is no res judicata effect on
private citizens who are not parties to the pre-enforcement action,
there is no deterrence to private citizens bringing their own law-
suit, as these private citizens were not parties in the pre-
enforcement action. Thus, a declaration of the statute's unconsti-
tutionality would not redress the pre-enforcement plaintiffs inju-
ry of ceasing to engage in certain conduct due to fear of a law-
suit.1 30
For these reasons, a declaratory judgment against public offi-
cials that the statute creating a private cause of action is uncon-
stitutional is a nonjusticiable advisory opinion and/or fails to sat-
isfy the redressability requirement.
2. Injunction Against a State Executive Officer Fails Standing's
Redressability Requirement
In many pre-enforcement actions challenging a state law, the
named defendant is the state attorney general because the attor-
ney general is the chief enforcement officer of the statute.131 Typi-
cally, the statute's threatened enforcement causes the injury. For
example, the threat of criminal prosecution for violating a statute
causes the pre-enforcement plaintiff to cease engaging in that
conduct. If that conduct is constitutionally protected, then enjoin-
ing the attorney general from prosecuting the pre-enforcement
plaintiff would allow the pre-enforcement plaintiff to continue en-
gaging in the conduct without risk of prosecution, thus redressing
the injury.
tion among the same parties. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
128. See, e.g., Allen, 449 U.S. at 94.
129. See Rosman, supra note 107, at 729-30; cf. Martin, supra note 120, at 746 (argu-
ing that the reason declaratory judgments are not always advisory opinions is because
they are binding on the parties to the lawsuit).
130. Several more equally speculative, and thus unconvincing, reasons why a declara-
tory judgment would satisfy the redressability requirement have been asserted, including
that in response to a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, the state legislature
"might repeal or amend the statute.... [or] the attorney general might issue an opinion
advising that private lawsuits brought under the act would fail due to the statute's uncon-
stitutionality." Borgmann, supra note 2, at 781-82. These reasons are wholly speculative
and thus do not satisfy the standing requirement. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
131. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149 (1908); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Att'y Gen. of
Va., 940 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Borgmann, supra note 2, at 778.
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While typically, especially in the criminal setting, such circum-
stances allow for a pre-enforcement action when the statute cre-
ates a private cause of action for civil liability, an injunction
against an executive officer cannot redress the injury. 132 While
the causation element is satisfied via the attorney general's will-
ingness to enforce and defend the statute or the governor signing
the bill into law, 133 an injunction against either of these executive
officers would not redress the injury. Thus, the redressability re-
quirement is not met.
Under state statutes creating a private cause of action, the
state governor, attorney general, and other public figures have no
enforcement role. 134 Unlike a criminal statute, for example, that
authorizes the attorney general to prosecute individuals, private-
ly enforced statutes give the "enforcement" power to private citi-
zens and, more specifically, the group that can utilize the private
cause of action (in the abortion context, the women who suffered
an injury resulting from the abortion). In other words, the statute
remains in full force even if the court orders the state governor,
attorney general, and other public figures to not enforce the stat-
ute.
As such, an injunction enjoining these defendants would not
remedy the plaintiffs injury of being de facto compelled to cease
engaging in arguably constitutionally protected conduct due to
the risk of liability. 135 The requested injunction could order one of
two things: (1) enjoin the public defendants from bringing a law-
suit as private citizens under the private cause of action (for ex-
ample, as a person who suffered emotional distress from their
own previous abortion); and/or (2) enjoin the public defendants
from enforcing the statute. The first injunction would not remedy
the plaintiffs injury because even if the governor, attorney gen-
eral, and other public officials are enjoined from filing lawsuits as
private citizens, that leaves hundreds of thousands of other po-
132. It is important to note that an injunction enjoins a person from enforcing a stat-
ute. It does not enjoin the statute itself. Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 361 (5th Cir.
1999) (Jolly, J., dissenting) ("A court ... does not enjoin a statute. A statute itself cannot
operate to effect any result; an injunction enjoins defendants who are attempting to en-
force or apply the statute."). Furthermore, an injunction can only enjoin parties to the law-
suit and certain unrelated individuals specifically affiliated with those parties; it cannot
enjoin unrelated, nonaffiliated nonparties. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2).
133. See Borgmann, supra note 2, at 777-79.
134. E.g., supra note 65 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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tential plaintiffs that could still potentially bring suit (in the
abortion context, any woman who has had an abortion or who
could, in the future, have an abortion). 136 Thus, the pre-
enforcement plaintiff will still feel compelled to cease to engage in
the de facto prohibited conduct. The second type of injunction
would not redress the injury because the statute is entirely pri-
vately enforced, as the statute would remain in full force even if
the court ordered the state governor, attorney general, and other
public figures to not enforce the statute.
Indeed, there is little merit to arguing that an injunction will
satisfy the redressability requirement in this context. 137 In the
two key cases relating to this issue, Okpalobi v. Foster 138 and No-
va Health Systems v. Gandy,139 where the majority held that the
pre-enforcement plaintiffs lacked standing, the dissenting judges
conceded that an injunction would not remedy the plaintiffs' in-
juries.140
3. Injunction Against the State Legislature Fails Standing's
Redressability Requirement
Similar problems with redressability arise if the pre-
enforcement plaintiff sues the state legislature. 141 While the legis-
lature arguably caused the pre-enforcement plaintiffs injury by
enacting the statute,142 obtaining an injunction against the legis-
lature would not redress the pre-enforcement plaintiffs injury.
An injunction cannot order the legislature to repeal a stat-
ute. 143 As such, the only remedial effect an injunction against a
legislator would have would be to prevent the legislator from
136. See, e.g., Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir. 2005).
137. In addition to the redressability requirement not being met, there may be sover-
eign immunity issues precluding the lawsuit as well. See, e.g., Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 423-
24 (en banc) (plurality).
138. Id. at 429.
139. 416 F.3d at 1160.
140. See id. at 1162-68 (Briscoe, J., dissenting); Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 433 (Benavides,
J., dissenting).
141. Moreover, a lawsuit against the legislature may not even be possible due to legis-
lative immunity. See Rosman, supra note 107, at 754. But see Manian, supra note 6, at
178-97 (while conceding that the Eleventh Amendment bars a lawsuit against the legisla-
ture as a whole, arguing that legislative immunity does not bar a lawsuit against individ-
ual legislators).
142. Borgmann, supra note 2, at 777-78.
143. See Manian, supra note 6, at 178-79.
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bringing a lawsuit as a private citizen under the private cause of
action created by the statute. As was the case if a pre-
enforcement action was brought against the state attorney gen-
eral or governor, such an injunction would not remedy the plain-
tiffs injury, as there would still be hundreds of thousands of oth-
er potential plaintiffs that could still potentially bring suit. 144
IV. THE SOLUTION: SUING STATE JUDGES FOR AN INJUNCTION
The implicit underlying issue discussed throughout this com-
ment is determining who the correct defendant would be in a pre-
enforcement action challenging the constitutionality of a statute
that creates a private cause of action. As discussed in Part III,
bringing a pre-enforcement action against state executive officials
or state legislators would not satisfy the redressability require-
ment, and, thus, the lawsuit would not be justiciable. Further-
more, one could not bring a pre-enforcement action against pri-
vate individuals who could potentially bring suit under the
private cause of action because it is unknown which of the thou-
sands, if not millions, of potential parties will actually bring suit
in the years to come. Thus, the question remains: Who to sue?
The answer to that question is to seek an injunction against state
court judges in the state in which the statute was passed. There
are several issues that may arise in suing state judges in this
context-including standing and justiciability, cause of action,
and which judge(s) to sue-and each is addressed. This section
concludes by explaining why this proposed solution is the most
appropriate and prudent method of filing a pre-enforcement ac-
tion challenging statutes that create a private cause of action.
A. Standing Is Satisfied
As has been discussed, to have standing, there must be an inju-
ry in fact that was caused by the defendant and will be redressed
by the requested remedy. 145 In the context of the abortion statutes
discussed in Part I,146 the abortion providers have standing to
144. See, e.g., Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1159 (10th Cir. 2005).
145. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
146. As a reminder, these statutes create a private cause of action that allow women
who had an abortion to later sue the abortion provider for physical injury or emotional dis-
tress, suffered by the mother or unborn baby, as a result of the abortion. E.g., supra notes
13-18 and accompanying text.
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bring a pre-enforcement action against state judges to enjoin the
application of the statute that creates the private cause of action.
Regarding the first standing requirement, the abortion providers
suffer the injury of having to cease engaging in purported consti-
tutionally protected conduct or their chosen profession.147 The
risk of liability and significant damages potentially imposed
against them de facto compel abortion providers to cease provid-
ing abortions.148 Thus, the pre-enforcement plaintiff abortion pro-
vider intends to engage in conduct affected with a "constitutional
interest," that is "arguably proscribed" by the statute,1 49 and the
risk of injury is substantially credible.150 As such, the injury-in-
fact requirement is satisfied.15 '
The second standing requirement, causation, is also satisfied
when state judges are the defendants. If the pre-enforcement
plaintiffs injury is having to forgo constitutionally protected con-
duct due to the risk of liability, that injury is caused by the judg-
es' willingness to hear lawsuits brought under the private cause
of action created by the statute. Statutes creating a private cause
of action are meaningless and harmless if a court will not hear
the lawsuit. But when a court is willing to hear a lawsuit, the risk
of liability resulting from the private cause of action compels the
potential defendants to cease to engage in the conduct that could
create liability. As such, the state judges' willingness to hear the
lawsuits under the statute causes the injury.1 52
The third standing requirement, redressability, is also satisfied
when the pre-enforcement action is brought against state judges,
rather than the state legislature or executive officials. Unlike an
injunction against state legislative or executive officials,1 53 an in-
147. E.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 980 (E.D. La. 1998) (pre-enforcement
plaintiff abortion providers alleging that Act 825 violates the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause it prevents them from practicing their chosen profession).
148. As well, there could be third-party standing where the abortion providers also
bring suit on behalf of their potential patients on the ground that the statute compels
abortion providers to cease providing abortions, which consequently causes women to ex-
perience an "undue burden" to obtain an abortion. E.g., id. at 979-80.
149. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. _, _, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343-45
(2014) (citations omitted).
150. See id. at 2345; Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
151. See supra Part III.A for a more in-depth discussion of the injury in fact require-
ment.
152. This analysis focuses on state judges' effect on the plaintiffs injury because it is
very likely that the private suit will be brought in state court. See supra note 122.
153. See supra Parts III.B.2-3.
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junction against state judges enjoining the application of the con-
tested statute would redress the pre-enforcement plaintiffs inju-
ry. If a state judge is enjoined from recognizing or applying the
statute-which consequently means the judge is enjoined from
recognizing or applying the private cause of action that the stat-
ute creates-then there is no longer a risk of liability if parties
engage in conduct that could have created liability under the pri-
vate cause of action (such as abortion providers providing abor-
tions). Unlike a federal court's declaratory judgment, which does
not bind state courts due to their co-equal status, 154 a federal
court injunction will bind state judges. 155
However, there is a viable argument that suing state judges for
pre-enforcement relief does not satisfy standing because no "case
or controversy" exists when state judges are the defendants. 156
The standing doctrine-injury in fact, causation, and redressabil-
ity-was created to effectuate Article III's "cases" or "controver-
sies" requirement.157 More specifically, the standing doctrine is
meant to determine "whether the 'conflicting contentions of the
parties . . . present a real, substantial controversy between par-
ties having adverse legal interests."'15 8 When judges are defend-
ants, the argument that there are no "adverse legal interests" is
that:
Judges sit as arbiters without a personal or institutional stake on ei-
ther side of the constitutional controversy. They are sworn to uphold
the Constitution of the United States. They will consider and decide
a claim . .. without any interest beyond the merits of the case. Al-
most invariably, they have played no role in the statute's enactment,
they have not initiated its enforcement, and they do not even have
an institutional interest in following their prior decisions (if any)
concerning its constitutionality if an authoritative contrary legal de-
termination has subsequently been made . . . .159
154. Martin, supra note 120, at 753.
155. Id.; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 65(d)(2) (stating that an injunction binds the parties to
the lawsuit).
156. See, e.g., In re Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 21 (1st
Cir. 1982) ("We also agree that, at least ordinarily, no 'case or controversy' exists between
a judge who adjudicates claims under a statute and a litigant who attacks the constitu-
tionality of the statute.").
157. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
158. Babbitt v. UFW Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting Ry. Mail Ass'n v.
Const., 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945)).
159. In re Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d at 21.
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The response to this concern is twofold. First, as was just dis-
cussed, the three standing requirements are still satisfied. Sec-
ond, if a pre-enforcement action is brought against the judges, the
state attorney general or a similar public official will inevitably
intervene in the lawsuit. The statute was enacted because it had
the support of the legislative and executive branches of the state
government-it could not have been enacted without both
branches' approval (absent an override of the governor's veto). As
such, the state government desires to keep the statute in effect1 60
and would be opposed to any challenges to void it, which is the
purpose of the pre-enforcement action. Thus, in the abortion con-
text, if abortion providers file a pre-enforcement action seeking to
enjoin state judges from applying the private cause of action, the
state government, in some form, will intervene in the case to de-
fend the statute's constitutionality so that it remains in effect. In
this way, there will be sufficient "adverse legal interests"161 to
provide "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions." 162 Thus, the three standing re-
quirements are satisfied and there will ultimately be adverse le-
gal interests involved in the lawsuit. As such, the pre-
enforcement action should be found justiciable in federal court. 163
B. Section 1983 Provides the Cause of Action Against State
Judges
In addition to having standing, the pre-enforcement plaintiff
must have a cause of action to bring against the state judges. The
cause of action is provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows par-
ties to sue judges, who in their official "judicial capacity," 164 Vio-
late the plaintiffs constitutional or statutory rights. 165 However,
160. The pre-enforcement action would be brought immediately following the statute's
enactment, so there is no viable risk, absent rare circumstances, that a new administra-
tion with opposing views will take over prior to the lawsuit.
161. Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298.
162. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. _, _, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). As Professor Borgmann articulated, "the states'
eagerness to defend the statute's merits ... creates the odor of a 'case or controversy."'
Borgmann, supra note 2, at 774 (citations omitted).
163. Federal courts would have jurisdiction to hear this pre-enforcement action under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the pre-enforcement plaintiff would be alleging that the state
violated the United States Constitution.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
165. See, e.g., Lake v. Speziale, 580 F. Supp. 1318, 1320-21, 1342 (D. Conn. 1984)
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under § 1983, to obtain an injunction against a judge for the
judge's conduct taken in his or her judicial capacity, a declaratory
judgment must have first been violated or declaratory relief must
be unavailable. 166 As discussed in Part III.B.1, declaratory relief
is unavailable because it would be an advisory opinion, and a pre-
enforcement plaintiff does not have standing to obtain a declara-
tory judgment. Therefore, § 1983 provides a proper cause of ac-
tion to obtain an injunction against a judge concerning the appli-
cation of a statute creating a private cause of action.
To bring a § 1983 claim, the judge must cause the plaintiff "to
be subjected . .. to the deprivation of any rights [or] privileges ...
secured by the Constitution and laws." 1 6 7 In Shelley v. Kraemer,
the United States Supreme Court held that if a court enforces a
contract that violates the Constitution, the court engages in un-
constitutional conduct. 168 In that same vein of reasoning, if a
court upholds an unconstitutional statute, it engages in unconsti-
tutional conduct. The judge's willingness to hear a lawsuit
brought under the private cause of action created by the statute
effectuates the purportedly unconstitutional statute, and thus
causes the judge to be complicit-even if unintentionally complic-
it-in restricting constitutionally protected conduct. Thus, the
judge's willingness causes the pre-enforcement plaintiff to con-
tinue not engaging in conduct purportedly "secured by the Consti-
tution."169 This should be sufficient for a federal court to at least
hear a § 1983 claim to determine whether a preliminary injunc-
tion is warranted until the merits of the case can be heard. 170
Finally, unlike the sovereign immunity issues that potentially
arise when suing the state legislature or executive branch,171 su-
(seeking relief individually and for the putative class alleging that the refusal of the Judg-
es of the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut to advise indigent individuals of their
rights to counsel was a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
167. Id.
168. 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
170. Cf. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (suggesting that because the
plaintiff-respondents did not sue the state judges to challenge the law's constitutionality,
an injunction against the state judges was not as appropriate compared to if the plaintiff-
respondents sought to challenge the law's constitutionality). In the pre-enforcement ac-
tions discussed in this comment, the pre-enforcement plaintiff would be suing to challenge
the statute's constitutionality.
171. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
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ing individual judges for injunctive relief is not barred by judicial
immunity.172
C. Determining Which Judge(s) to Sue
In determining which judge(s) to bring the pre-enforcement ac-
tion against, there are two approaches to making this decision.
The first and better option is to sue the chief judge in the district,
or the chief justice of the state supreme court, along with all the
lower trial judges. 173 The chief judge within the district or the
chief justice of the state supreme court has the authority to in-
struct the other appropriate judges, so by enjoining the chief
judge or justice, the plaintiff can enjoin the other relevant judges.
The second approach would be to sue the state judges in the
district where the pre-enforcement plaintiff resides and works. In
this manner, the pre-enforcement plaintiff can enjoin the judges
where there would be proper venue if the pre-enforcement plain-
tiff were sued under the private cause of action. 174 However, this
would only preclude the application of the statute if only one de-
fendant was sued under the private cause of action and the de-
fendant resided in, worked in, or engaged in the conduct giving
rise to the cause of action in the same district.175 If there was a
proper venue outside of the district where the state judges were
enjoined, the statute creating the private cause of action could
still be applied.
D. Final Justifications for This Comment's Proposed Solution
The solution this comment proposes-suing state judges in a
pre-enforcement action for injunctive relief-is admittedly an im-
perfect solution. As Part IV.A discusses, when a judge is the de-
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (creating a cause of action against judges).
173. E.g., Lake v. Speziale, 580 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (D. Conn. 1984) (suing all the state
superior court judges, with the chief justice of the state supreme court as the first named
defendant).
174. A pre-enforcement plaintiff would only have to preclude the application of the pri-
vate cause of action where there would be proper venue for the private suit against him
because a lawsuit can only be brought if there is proper venue.
175. This is because in many states, there is proper venue in any district where any
defendant resides, is employed, or where the cause of action arose (which, in the abortion
context, would be the location where the abortion was performed). See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 8.01-262 (Cum. Supp. 2017), 8.01-263 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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fendant, there may not be a live "case or controversy" sufficient to
make the case justiciable. One may disagree that § 1983 provides
a proper cause of action, as Part IV.B argues. There are concerns
of federalism and comity.1"6 Yet the alternative is to deny pre-
enforcement challenges, which, in effect, is to allow unconstitu-
tional statutes to potentially remain in effect, restricting constitu-
tionally protected conduct.
Thus, while imperfect, this comment's proposed solution is the
best possible solution to a very real and significant issue. Because
individual constitutional rights threatened by a private cause of
action are protected by pre-enforcement challenges, pre-
enforcement challenges must be kept available. Potentially relax-
ing justiciability doctrines-namely Article III's live case or con-
troversy requirement-is preferable to rigidly adhering to justici-
ability doctrines and making pre-enforcement challenges
unavailable. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has previ-
ously relaxed Article III's justiciability doctrine in order to protect
individuals' constitutional rights.17 7
Furthermore, this comment's proposed solution adheres most
closely to current justiciability doctrines. To bend justiciability
doctrines to allow a pre-enforcement action against state execu-
tive officials or the state legislature would require courts to either
allow the rendering of advisory opinions by federal courts, 178 or
completely eliminate standing's redressability requirement.179 Al-
lowing advisory opinions and completely eliminating or ignoring
the redressability requirement would involve significant altera-
tions to established judicial and constitutional principles, 180 much
176. See, e.g., Freedom Commc'ns, Inc. v. Mancias, 129 F.3d 609 (5th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (unpublished table decision); Pompey v. Broward Cty., 95 F.3d 1543, 1548-49 n.6
(11th Cir. 1996); Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1995).
177. E.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85, 105-06 (1968) (abandoning the previous doc-
trine that a taxpayer always lacks standing to challenge a statute's constitutionality, and
holding that a taxpayer can have such standing to ensure his tax money is being used con-
stitutionally).
178. See supra Part III.B.1 (arguing that awarding a declaratory judgment in a pre-
enforcement action challenging the constitutionality of a statute that creates a private
cause of action would be a nonjusticiable advisory opinion).
179. See supra Part III.B.2-3 (arguing that awarding an injunction, against state offi-
cials, in a pre-enforcement action challenging the constitutionality of a statute that cre-
ates a private cause of action does not satisfy the redressability requirement).
180. To allow advisory opinions or to eliminate one-third of the standing doctrine would
significantly undermine the entire federal justiciability doctrine. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 47, at 54 ("[T]he prohibition of advisory opinions is at the core of Article III [of the
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more so than allowing the state government's intervention into
the lawsuit to satisfy the actual case or controversies-and "ad-
verse legal interests"-requirements in a pre-enforcement action
against state judges. 181 Thus, while admittedly imperfect, this
comment's proposed solution permits pre-enforcement lawsuits to
ensure that constitutional rights are protected, while most closely
adhering to current justiciability doctrines.
CONCLUSION
State legislatures should not be able to restrict constitutional
rights by creating a private cause of action. But, under the stand-
ing doctrine and the prohibition of advisory opinions, legislatures
have that ability if a pre-enforcement action can only be brought
against the state legislative or executive branches. While the
standing doctrine effectuates Article III of the United States Con-
stitution, it effectively-albeit indirectly-permits the restriction
of constitutional rights. Thus, it is essential that pre-enforcement
plaintiffs have the ability to challenge statutes in a pre-
enforcement action, because without a pre-enforcement action,
there may never be any challenge to the statute, and an allegedly
unconstitutional statute could forever remain in effect.
The solution is to file pre-enforcement actions against state
judges to obtain an injunction enjoining state judges from apply-
ing the purportedly unconstitutional statute. This is admittedly
an imperfect solution. However, under current justiciability doc-
trines, that is the price that must be paid to ensure that constitu-
tional rights are protected, as there is no other possible pre-
enforcement defendant. Moreover, when considering what is at
stake, and when considering the ultimate outcome, suing state
judges is not so outlandish. Normally, after a successful challenge
to a statute's constitutionality, an injunction enjoins the govern-
ment's enforcement of the statute; when this happens, state
United States Constitution] . . . [and] the other justiciability doctrines exist largely to en-
sure that federal courts will not issue advisory opinions. That is, it is because standing ...
implement[s] the policies and requirements contained in the advisory opinion doctrine
that it is usually unnecessary for the Court to separately address the ban on advisory
opinions."); see also id. at 47 (explaining that the prohibition on advisory opinions main-
tains separation of powers, conserves judicial resources, and ensures that the courts hear
real and non-hypothetical disputes).
181. See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
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courts can no longer hear cases that arise under that statute be-
cause the government can no longer enforce it. The solution pro-
posed in this comment-an injunction directly enjoining state
judges from applying the statute in a lawsuit-has the exact
same effect. If the former is acceptable, the latter should be as
well, especially when constitutional rights are at stake.
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